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The main objective of this dissertation is to prove that the EACC has been ineffective in the fight
against corruption due to the absence of prosecutoriaI powers. It analyses the history of corruption
in Kenya in order to demonstrate the factors which often fiustrate the fight against conuption. It
also scrutinises the legal framework of the EACC in order to establish whether it allows the EACC
the authority and independence it needs to reduce corruption and economic crimes in Kenya . The
dissertation then analyses the successes of the Sierra Leone Anti-Corruption Commission with
regards to prosecution of corruption and proposes recommendations that the EACC should adopt
in order to enhance the fight against corruption.
This dissertation shall be limited to corruption offences that have occurred within the territory of
Kenya. Moreover, the dissertation shall only deal with two specific types of corruption, grand
corruption and looting. It analyses the prosecution of public officials for the offences of looting
and grand conuption. It shall also look at the impediments to prosecution of these corruption
offences as opposed to any other criminal prosecution.
Secondary sources have been the only form of data relied upon in this dissertation. Qualitative data
revealed that anti-corruption institutions in Kenya have been ineffective in the fight against
corruption. This has been attributed to many factors including the fact that it lack powers of
prosecution. This dissertation has found that the DPP has frustrated the successful conviction of
corruption cases owing to the lack of political will to conduct prosecution.
The justification for undertaking this dissertation is that c0fl1;1ption causes us massive economic
losses every year. This cost is unjustifiable and so it is crucial that we seek to protect our economy
from these losses. The anti-conuption initiatives undertaken should be more effective for their
purposes, the EACC should in this regard be empowered as is necessary to ensure efficient
prosecution of graft.
The dissertation proposes that the current anti-corruption law be amended in order to confer
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This chapter provides the background to the problem and seeks to illustrate the challenge that the
dissertation has undertaken to attempt to solve. This chapter introduces the research that influenced
the topic of this dissertation. It presents the research problem and sets the objectives of the
dissertation while delineating the scope of the study and providing. It also very importantly
provides the justification for embarking on this study and provides a summary of all the chapters
of this dissertation.
1.2.Background of the problem
Corruption is the unlawful use of official power or influence by an official of the government to
either enrich himself or further his course and/or any other person at the expense of the public, in
contravention of his oath of office and/or contrary to the conventions or laws that are in force. 1 It
broadly includes actions that foster, aid and abet the improper use of or selfish exercise of power
and influence attached to public offices for the acquisition of various rights and interests to the
discrimination of other potential beneficiaries.'
Corruption is undoubtedly a major challenge in Kenya, 3the effects including the undermining of:
political stability, sustainable development, institutions, and values of democracy, ethical values
and justice, preconditions of growth and equity, and the rule of law," The Kenyan government has
indeed taken up measures in attempts to stamp out the menace of corruption, These measures
1 Ekiyor H, 'Corruption in Local Government Administration: A Historical summary' as in Local Government
Administration in Nigeria : Old and New Vision, 2009.
2 Minoru 0 , 'A study of corruption: A paradigm for analysis ' , Jachiyo journal ofInterna tional Studies. 1997. Vol.
IX, No.4, 1-2.
3 Exemplifying this, the World Bank temporarily banned Kenya from taking loans in 2002 becaus e of corrupt practices
by the Kenyan government.
See Finer J, 'World Bank focused on fighting corruption: Graft and Bribery, once tolerated, punished by blacklisting'
Global Policy Forum , 4 July 2003.
4 Preamble, United Nations Convention against Corruption (31 October 2003) UN Doc. AJ58/422 (2003) 43 ILM 37.
include enactment of legislation' ratification of international conventions'' and creation of agencies
whose roles are or are incidental to the enforcement of anti-corruption practices."
Despite these efforts, however, corruption cases in Kenya have been on the increase based on
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. S The conditions for the rise of
corruption include the weakness and ineffectiveness of the public institutions controlling
corruption." This in essence attributes the malaise of corruption to the legal system for not creating
a legal framework that would enable the proper prosecution and punishment of corruption
offences. 10
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) is a public body in Kenya established in
2011 11 with the mandate of combating and preventing corruption and economic crime in Kenya
through law enforcement, preventive measures, public education, and promotion of standards and
practices of integrity, ethics, and anti-corruption. l2Its powers include - educating and creating
awareness; undertaking preventive measures; conducting investigations, and conflict resolution. 13
It has faced some challenges in fulfilling mandate, which include, among others, slow judicial
5 Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of 2003); Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (Act
No. 22 of 2011); Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No.9 of 2009); Public Finance
Management Act (2012), Public Officer Ethics Act ( Act No.4 2003); Public Procurement and Disposal Act (Act No.
33 of 20 15); Witness Protection Act , (Act No. 16 of 2006) .
6 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (3 February 2007) 43 ILM 5; United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, (20 Dec 1988). U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.82/15 (1988) 128 ILM.493 (1989); United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (15
November 2000). 40 ILM 335 (2001); United Nations Convention against Corruption (31 October 2003) UN Doc.
N58/422 (2003) 43 ILM 37.
7The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), The Office of the Auditor General; The Public Complaints
Standing Committee (PCSC); The Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA).
8 Kenya had a score of27 in 2012, 27 in 2013, but the score increased to 25 in 2014. (A country or territory's score
indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)) .
See Transparency International, Corruption perceptions index, Berlin, Germany, Transparency International
Secretariat, 2014. - hllp:llwww .transparency.org/cpi2014/results#myAnchorl on 11 December 2015.
9 Jain A, 'Corruption: Theory, Evidence And Policy', Vol 9 CESifo DICE Report Issue 2, 212011 , 5.
10 Matemu M, Annual Report for the 7th Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Annual General Meeting , Ethics
and Anti-Corruption Commission, 2012-2013 .
II Section 3(1), ), Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (No. 22 of 20 11)
12 Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, 'About EACC'.- http://www .eacc.go.ke/defaull.asp.?pageid=3 on 11 June
2016.
13 Section 13 .Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act (No. 22 of2011)
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process, demands of the devolved system of government, shortcomings III the policy legal
framework and inadequate institutional capacity. 14
The EACC was, however, not the first of its kind as a statutory body established for the purposes
of fighting against corruption. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (hereinafter KACA) was the
forerunner of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and thereafter the current Ethics and Anti -
Corruption Commission (hereinafter KACC). Both of these bodies faced similar challenges to
those of the EACC. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (hereinafter KACA) was established in
1975. The repealed Prevention of Corruption Act conferred upon it the power "to investigate, and
subject to the directions ofthe Attorney-General, to prosecute for offences under this Act and other
offences involving corrupt transactions.i'P Its power to prosecute was thus limited and subject to
I the approval of the Attorney-General. This prosecutorial power, however, was one of the issues
that later contributed to its collapse'" as it was viewed as unconstitutional due to conflict with the
1963 Constitution17 which conferred only the Attorney-General the power to prosecute in the
public interest. 18 The Stephen Gachiego case affinned that the power was unconstitutional. 19
The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (hereinafter KACC) was established in 2003 under the
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act replacing the KACA. 20 Unlike its predecessor, the
KACC had no prosecutorial powers, limited or otherwise, The ACECA, however, gave the KACC
wide investigative powers?' , privileges, and immunities akin to police officers." The KACC
14 Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, The fight against corruption in Kenya: Achievements, experiences,
challenges and the way forward, 29th - 30th October 2015, para 5.1-5.4 .
15 Section lIB (3) (c), Prevention ofCorruption Act (Act No. 33 of1956). (Repealed by Anti-corruption and
Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of2003).
1(,In addition to the issue ofseparation ofpowers arising from the appointment ofJustice Aaron Ringera as its director.
See Anassi P, Corruption in Africa : The Kenyan Experience, Trafford Publishing, Bloomington, 2004, 117.
17 Kibwana K, Akivaga S K, Mute L M, and Odhiambo M (eds .), Initiatives against corruption in Kenya : Legal and
Policy Interventions 1995-2001, Claripress, Nairobi, 2001 ,36.
18 See also Article 26, Constitution ofKenya (Amendment) Bill (Act No.3 of2001).
19 Stephen Mwai Gachiengo & another v Republic [2000] eKLR, 5.
20 Section 6 (I), Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of2003).
21 Sections 7 (I) (a) and 65, Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of2003).
22 Section 23 (3), Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of2003).
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suffered from the same inefficiencies cited by its predecessor.P The EACC replaced it after the
enactment of the Constitution, 20 10.24
In the current constitutional discourse, powers of prosecution are divided such that the Attorney-
General has the authority to handle all offences not being criminal" whereas the Office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions prosecutes criminal offences.26However, the Constitution also
provides that "Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution on authorities
other than the Director of Public Prosecution.v" Parliament thus has the ability to enact legislation
conferring the power to prosecute corruption cases upon the EACC.
There have been calls to have the legislature enact legislation conferring prosecutorial powers upon
the EACc.28Proponents attribute the ineffective prosecution of corruption cases to the failures of
the DPP with some commissioners accusing the DPP of 'stonewalling'.29 The courts have also
noted bias and failure to act fairly , faithfully and impartially on the part of prosecutors." The
legal!' and political system of Kenya is described by some as being geared towards the protection
of accused government officials and validation of their conduct.32
23 KACC Assistant Director, Dr. Smokin Wanjala, said KACC would be more effective if it was given powers to
prosecute.
See Standard team, 'Kenya: KACC Accuses Attorney General of Frustrating Graft War' , The Standard, September
25th 2006. - http://allafrica.com/stories/200609250173.htmlon 13 January 2016.
See also 'AG Fails to Act on 36 Corruption Cases ', Daily nation, Nov. 19, 2004.
http://allafrica .com/stories /200411180853.html on 13 January 2016
24 Mumo Matemu, Annual Report f or the seventh Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Annual General Meeting,
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, 2012-2013 .
25 Article 156, The Constitution ofKenya (20 I0).
26 Article 157, The Constitution ofKenya (20 I0).
27 Article 157(12), The Constitution of Kenya (2010).
28 Gathii J, 'Kenya's Long Anti-Corruption Agenda: 1952-2010: Prospects and Challenges of the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Under the 2010 Constitution', 4 Law and Developm ent Review, 2011, 69.
29 'Why does Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission probe cases that Director of Public Prosecutions dismisses
casually?' Standard Digital. Saturday, Junc 13 2015. - htto://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000165509/why-
does-ethics-and-anti-cormption-commission-probe-cases-that-director-of-public-prosecutions-dismisses-casually on
10 February 2016.
30 Republic v. Judicial. Commission ofInquiry into the Goldenberg Affair ex parte George Saitoti, [2006], High Court
of Kenya at Nairobi, Petition 102 July 31, 2006, 56.
31 There have been arguments that the laws themselves have fueled corruption,
See Kenya Anti-Corrupt ion Commission & Association Of Professional Societies In East Africa , A Report Of The
Joint Workshop On Governance, Ethics And Integrity Among Professionals , 5-6 October 2006, 18.
32 Gathii J, 'Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya,' 49
William and Mary Law Review, 2008, 1125-1134.
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On the other hand, some argue that such conferment would be unnecessary especially because it
would require a constitutional amendment, which is often a long and tedious process33 and as some
parliamentarians argue, the challenge in fighting corruption largely lies with the judiciary.34 Others
have argued on grounds of unconstitutionality and separation of powers." Finally, some have
argued that the ineffectiveness of prosecuting conuption cases is owing to the failure of
commissioners to conduct full investigations satisfying the evidentiary burden."
The lack of consensus on the subject of prosecutorial powers of the EACC has fuelled the writing
of this study.
1.3.Statement of the Problem
Prosecution of conuption cases has arisen as a major factor in making the fight against corruption
effective. The effectiveness of the EACC in fighting conuption is heavily dependent on the
prosecution of the case after the close of investigations. This study attempts to show that the
absence of prosecutorial powers by the EACC makes it ineffective in the fight against conuption
and specifically argues that endowing EACC with prosecutorial powers would make it more
effective in the fight against corruption in Kenya. The legal framework on corruption in Kenya
should therefore grant the EACC both investigative and prosecutorial powers.
1.4.Assumptions
This dissertation attempts to prove the following assumptions:
1. There is need for an effective anti-corruption body in Kenya.
2. The investigative powers of the EACC are inadequate without prosecutorial powers.
33 Gathii J, 'Kenya' s Long Anti-Corruption Agenda', 29.
34 Mwige K, "The UN Convention Against Corruption Implementation & Enforcement: Meeting the Challenges",
Anti-Corruption Conference, Commonwealth Secretariat & Chatham House, 2006, 57.
See also National Anti-Corruption Plan, Report on the Proceedings of the National Anti -Corruption Stakeholders
Conference, Bomas of Kenya, 30 May 2006 .
35 Gathii J, 'Kenya's Long Anti-Corruption Agenda ', 28.
36 Shiundu A'Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko punches holes in EACC probe on Eurobond, demands
answers', Standard Digital. 23 January 2016 .-
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000189064/director-of-pub lic-prosecutions-keriako-tobiko-punches-holes-
in-eacc-probe-on-eurobond-demands-answers on 17 February 2016
See also Kipchumba S, 'Kenya's suspended officials' fate unknown two months after corruption purge', Standard
Digital. 31 May 2015 . -
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/mobile/article/2000 164076/kenyas-suspended-officials- fate-unknown -two-months-
after-corruption-purge?pageNo=2 on 17th February 2016.
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3. The EACC has been ineffective in the fight against corruption largely owing to the absence
ofprosecutorial powers.
1.5.Research Objectives
This general aim of this study is to prove that national anti-corruption bodies are important in the
fight against corruption and that their role should be enhanced to ensure effective performance of
their duties.
The specific aims of the study however include:
1. To prove that the investigative powers of the EACC are inadequate in the fight against
corruption.
2. To prove that prosecutorial powers would enable the EACC fight against corruption more
effectively.
1.6. Research Questions
This research attempts to answer the following questions:
• What does the investigative power of the EACC allow the EACC to do?
• How effective has the EACC been in the fight against corruption?
• What are the major challenges facing the EACC in the fight against corruption?
• Would the EACC be more effective if it had prosecutorial powers?
1.7.Literature Review
The study has gained from the multiplicity of publications available on the subject. Though the
literature used in the study may contain several themes, this review focuses only on the literature
that has guided the dissertation on the subject of prosecutorial powers of anti-corruption bodies.
Kibwana, Wanjala, and Owiti (1996),37 addressed the problem of corruption but primarily
addresses how corruption manifests in Kenya and the importance of tackling corruption and
corruption-related offences in Kenya. Having been written before the formation of anti-corruption
bodies, this book had such excellent recommendations as setting up and empowering an anti-
37 Kibwana K, Wanjala S, and Owiti 0 (eds.), The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal, Political and Socio-
Economic Perspectives Claripress, Nairobi, 1996,45,192-193.
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corruption body. Though with little explanation, it also considered that these anti-corruption bodies
should be empowered to handle the prosecution of anti-corruption offences.
In Kibwana, Akivaga, Mute, and Odhiambo (2001),38 the authors scrutinize the prosecutorial
powers previously held by the KACA highlighting the challenge that the KACA's prosecutorial
power was not independent of the Attorney-General 's office. The book recommends that
prosecutorial powers should be granted to anti-corruption agencies in accordance with
investigations and due process. It further recommends that such powers be independent of the
Attorney-General's or any other government office in order to avoid bureaucratic delays and
interference.
In Anassi (2004),39 the book takes a historical approach telling Kenya's story of anti-corruption.
On prosecutorial powers of anti-corruption institutions, it addresses the issues and challenges
facing the prosecutions by the KACA. It primarily does so through analysis of the effects of the
prosecutions undertaken by the first director of the KACA, Harun Mwau, and thereafter the
Stephen Gachiengo Case during Aaron Ringera's term as KACA director.
The UNODC (2004) posits that officials enabled to initiate or conduct criminal prosecutions or
punishments often abuse their power through use of the threat of corruption as a means of
extortion. This contributes to the subject of this dissertation to illustrate that the vesting of
prosecutorial power on the EACC would reduce abuse of prosecutorial powers in line with the
principal-agent relationship theory used herein. It further states the major disadvantages of a
separate anti-corruption institution as including the lack of cooperation with the prosecution
authorities.t"
In Chweya, Tuta, and Akivaga (2005),41 though he notes that a prosecution that leads to a
conviction would be the most visible proof of commitment to anti-corruption, Tuta (2005) also
argues that the prosecution of corruption cases is often very sophisticated and intricate especially
due to the difficulty to attain the evidentiary burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a
38 Kibwana K, Akivaga K, Mute M, and Odhiambo M (eds.), Initiatives against corruption in Kenya : Legal and Policy
Interventions 1995-2001, Claripress, 2001.
39 Anassi P, Corruption in Africa: The Kenyan Experience, 115- 120 .
40 United Nations Offic e on Drugs and Crime, The Global Programm e Against Corruption . UN Ant i-Corruption
Toolkit, third Edition, Vi enna , September 2004 .
4\ Chweya L, Tuta J, and Akivaga K, Control ofcorruption in Kenya. Legal-Political dimensions 2001-2004, Sihanya
B (ed.), Claripress, Nairobi, 2005.
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solution, he recommends such powers be donated to the KACC to enable the planning and
execution of anti-corruption efforts without unduly depending other bodies .F
Gathii (20 I0)43 has perhaps contributed most on the issues surrounding this study. He specifically
said ' it would have been prudent for the drafters to affirmatively confer the prosecutorial power to
the EACC in the constitution rather than making a conferral of this type merely permissible. ,44
Gathii goes further to argue that not conferring this power to the EACC leads to technicalities that
delay and jeopardise the prosecution of anti-corruption. However, this paper does not expound on
these technicalities and further it does not show how prosecution would be done better if it were
done by the EACC. This study, on the other hand, intends on addressing this lacuna.
Amukowa (2013) attributes failures of the KACC to the lack of coordination with the government
noting that 'KACC's success seemed to be dictated by the Attorney General 's office as it decided
on which cases to be prosecuted'. He further added that the limitation of the KACC's powers to
investigations rather than prosecutions was the major shortcoming of the legal framework."
Despite the existence of these and many more publications, this study still remains necessary.
Unlike majority of the publications which were concerned the KACC and KACA, this study is
based on the current institutional framework on anti-corruption- The EACC. Moreover, though the
available material argues for prosecutorial powers for anti-corruption agencies, they do not
illustrate how the conferral of prosecutorial power will revolutionise the fight against corruption.
This study intends to fill this lacuna.
1.8.Demarcating the Area of Study
The focus of this dissertation limited to the prosecution of grand corruption and looting in the
public sector, looking at corruption within government by public officials. This shall be to the
exclusion of petty corruption'" and corruption within the private sector.
42 Tuta J, 'Legal framework for the control of corruption ', in Chweya L, Tuta J, and Akivaga K, Control a/corruption
in Kenya. Legal-Political dimensions 2001-2004, Sihanya B (ed.), Claripress, Niarobi, 2005,211,222,238.
43 Gathii J, 'Kenya ' s Long Anti-Corruption Agenda' , 68-69 .
44 Gathii J, 'Kenya ' s Long Anti-Corruption Agenda ' , 69.
45 Amukowa W, 'The Challenges of Anti-Corruption Initiatives: Reflections on Strategies of the Defunct Kenya's
Anti-Corruption Commission ' in Mediterranean Journal ofSocial Sciences, Vol 4, No.2, 2013, 4, 21.
46 Kibwana K et al (cds.), Initiatives against corruption in Kenya, 137, 138.
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The geographical focus of this study shall be corrupt activities done in Kenya. However, this shall
not limit the application ofbest practices and lessons learnt drawn from foreign jurisdiction in this
study.
1.9.Justification
The government has incurred several costs in establishing institutions to fight corruption, which
have so far proven ineffective. Corruption within the public sector continues to affect the economic
growth and development in Kenya. This study is justified as it proposes measures that if adopted,
would increase the efficiencies of the EACC and thus reduce corruption and its effect in the
community. This study is further justified because despite the existence of several works written
on corruption, few publications have addressed the issue of prosecutorial powers for the EACC.
1.10. Chapter Breakdown
Chapter one of this dissertation serves as the introduction. It includes essential information
surrounding this study such as the research problem and objectives, assumptions, the literature
review framework, and the justification of the study.
Chapter two looks provides the theoretical framework that has guided this dissertation and the
specific reforms sought by this dissertation.
Chapter three looks at the overview of corruption in Kenya . It provides the working definition of
corruption and the types of corruption that will be dealt with in this dissertation. The second part
of this chapter then gives an overview of corruption in Kenya looking at the history of corruption
in the different government regimes.
Chapter 4 will the legal and institutional framework of corruption that has existed in Kenya, with
a focus on the current framework that Kenya adopts towards combating corruption. It focuses on
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the different frameworks. It also analyses the prosecution
of corruption in Kenya and points out the factors that have contributed to ineffective prosecution.
It then looks analyses the law and practice of prosecution of corruption in Sierra Leone and
discusses the findings from the analysis.
9
Finally, Chapter 5 will give the conclusions and recommendations of this study which will be
arrived at after looking at best practices adopted in two different countries.
10
CHAPTER 2
Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology
2.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter details the theoretical framework behind this dissertation. It explained the theories
that informed the solutions proposed against the menace of corruption. In this chapter, two theories
shall be analysed in connection to corruption. These are the principal-agent relationship and the
rule of law theory respectively. Before delving into the discussion on these theories, this chapter
shall include a section on the causes or determinants ofcorruption. This is an elementary precursor
to the discussion on theory . The second part of this chapter shall detail the research methodology
and explain the justification for using this methodology.
2.1.1. Determinants ofCorruption
This section does not attempt to understand the causes of corruption. Its causes are often far-
reaching and somewhat difficult to prove and are further not essential to the claims made by this
dissertation. Instead , this section attempts to outline conditions that nurture or enable the survival
of corruption. This will be vital in order to understand relationships that encourage corruption and
in so doing enable the formulation of practical solutions which will involve among other things,
the breaking-up of some of the relationships.
Kliitgard explains three factors that foster the growth of corruption. He stylizes these conditions
in a formulaic manner as follows: C = M + D - A.47 That is, corruption equals Monopoly plus
discretionary power less Accountability. This means that corruption is fostered where one has a
monopoly of power over resources and this is combined with discretion and a lack of
accountability." In this way, it is proposed that the absence of these factors would frustrate and
reduce corruption, that corruption would unlikely strive where there is no monopoly over
resources, where the authorities do not have discretionary powers and where the authorities are
held accountable for their actions.
47 Klitgaard R, Controlling Corruption , Berkley: University of California Press, Oakland, 1988,75.
48 Klitgaard R, ' International Cooperation against Corruption ' , in Finance & Development, 1998,4. -
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/klitgaar.pdf on 10 October 2016.
See also Gephart M, 'Contextualizing Conceptions of Corruption: Challenges for the International Anti-corruption
Campaign', in German Institute ofGlobal and Area Studies Working papers No. 115,2009, 9.
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In a similar vein, Jain argues that there are three factors that must co-exist in order for corruption
to flourish. These conditions as follows : i) the authorities or agents have discretionary power; ii)
there are economic rents associated with the discretionary power; and iii) public institutions
controlling corruption are weak and ineffective.i" In tune with Jain, this dissertation will analyse
these elements and later on propose theoretical solutions to corruption and its determinants.
2.1.1. Discretionary power
Jain explains these powers to include the authority to design regulations and to administer them."
These powers essentially result from regulations.51 Regulations allocate powers to those whom
will be charged with implementing said regulations.52 Regulations allocating wider powers will
thus allow more leeway for corruption, and even more leeway where the rules do not provide for
effective means of monitoring behaviour by some principal.P Naturally, these powers also make
it difficult to assess whether the agent has engaged in corrupt practices.
This factor provides a broad leeway for the agent to abuse these powers and enrich himself instead
of performing his duties. He will remain largely unchallenged since regulations allow him
sufficient discretion to make decisions and further because it would not be easily noticeable.
2.1.2. Economic rents
Rent-seeking is a term used to describe situations where people engage in activities in attempts to
obtain wealth transfers through the aegis of the state. 54 Tullock refers to it as "the manipulation of
democratic [or other types of] governments to obtain special privileges under circumstances where
the people injured by the privileges are hurt more than the beneficiary gains."55 Rent, thus, is the
part of the payment to an owner of resources over and above that which those resources could
command in any alternative use .56The essence of the rent is to stifle competition and disadvantage
49 Jain A, 'Corruption: A Review' 15(l) A journal ojeconomic surveys , 2008, 77.
50 Jain A, 'Corruption: A Review ' , 78.
51 Rose-Ackerman S, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy, Academic Press, New York, 1978.
52 Jain A, 'Corruption: A Review' , 78.
53 Bliss C and Di Tella R, 'Does Competition kill corruption' , Journal oJpolitical economy Vol. 105 No.5, pages
1001-123,1997,1002.
54 Pasour jr. E, 'Rent seeking: Some conceptual problems and implications ' , The review ofAustrian Economics,
1983,123 .
55 Tullock G, Rent Seeking, The Shaftesbury Papers, 2, Edward Elgar Publishers Co, 1993, 24, 51.
56 Buchanan J, 'Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking ' , in Buchanan J, Tollison R, and Tullock G, (eds.), Toward a
Theory ofThe Rent Seeking Soci ety , Texas A&M University , pages 3-15, 1980,46,47.
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competitors. It effectively creates monopoly power to the rent seeker due to the benefits obtained,
which effectively serve as barriers to entry for competitors."
Economic rents will thus directly foster corruption since those who would benefit are bound to
create measures to extract those rents through bribery.58 Favourable market restrictions will simply
be the privilege of those who offer the best incentives. The higher the value of the rents , the greater
the incentive for corruption.j"
2.1.3. Ineffective institutions
High levels of corruption are caused by deficient local capacity, for instance, deficient strategies
and low incentives to fight corruption.f'Corruption here depicts a situation where the public have
reduced ability to hold public officials accountable for their actions. Corruption will more likely
persist owing to failure to ensure accountability for their actions. When the institutions empowered
to fight against corruption are unable or unwilling to hold officials accountable, corruption will
survive.
Corruption is only a problem if it goes undetected and if sanctions are not imposed on the
perpetrators." There is a need for those who are charged with the detection or investigation of
corruption to be able to sanction the offenders. Otherwise, their roles become useless. Investigating
corruption is not an end in itself, the investigation should lead to prosecution, and where applicable,
the prosecution should lead to punishment. Failure to punish will allow corruption to thrive.
The EACC has reported that "In effect, corruption thrives where institutional checks and
accountability are lacking. More than any other factor, bad leadership, coupled with the absence
of a functional reward and punishment system through which a framework of values could have
57 Tollison R, 'Rent Seeking: a Survey' , Kyklos, Volume 35, pages. 575-602, 1982,578-579,582
'Rent Seeking ' . - http://www.economics-agruni.yolasite.com/resources/Rent%20seeking.pdf on 22 November 20 16.
58 Ades A & Di Tella R, 'National champions and corruption: some unpleasant interventionist arithmetic', The
Economic Journal Volume 107, pages 1023-1048 1997, 1023-1024.
59 Tullock G, 'The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft' . Western Economic Journal Volume 5, pages 224-
232, 1967, 228;
Jain A, 'Corruption: A Review', 79-80.
60 Kauffmann D, 'Corruption: The Facts ', Foreign Policy, 1997,3 .
61 Brandt U and Svendsen G, The Politics ofPersuasion: Should Lobbying be Regulated in the EU? , Edward Elgar
publishing, Northampton, 2009, Chapter 3,3.3.3.
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been instituted, have made possible the tragedy of corrupt enrichment and wastage of public
resources. "62
Effective anti-corruption legislation and policies can thus be developed based on these three
determinants. First, it should limit the powers of govemment officials by making them subject to
monitors or auditors who they'll have to report to. This would make it easier to detect COlTUpt
activity. Second, the anti-corruption and competition laws of the state should stifle the creation of
monopolies so as to reduce the value of economic rents attainable, thereby reducing the incidence
of bribery. Finally, the state should have a strong legal framework empowering institutions
established to combat corruption. These institutions should have wide powers necessary to combat
corruption i.e. wide investigative and prosecutorial powers.
The theories employed in this study are based on these three detenuinants of corruption, with
special focus on the latter determinant concemed with the creation of effective institutions. These
theories favour the creation of institutions which by their design, structure, and powers will be
effective in the fight against corruption.
2.2. Theoretical Framework
2.2.1 Rille ofLaw theory
This study employs arguments on the theory of the rule of law to explain the
importance of ensuring prosecution and punishment of corruption offenders. This is
especially concerning corruption offences by public officers or generally people
occupying high positions in government.
The rule of law argument addressed in particular herein is the theory as posed by
Dicey that 'Every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary
law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. '63 This
62 Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, National Ethics and Corruption Survey. 2015 Report, 2015, 2. -
http://www.eacc.go.ke/docs/National-Ethics-and-Corruption-Survey-20 15-REPORT-4March20 16.pdf on 16
November 2016.
63 Dicey A, An Introduction to the study ofthe law ofthe Constitution, Macmillan publishers, London, 1885, Part II.
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then requires that government officials be held accountable and subject to ordinary
prosecution and court process where in order to hold them accountable.
Smith writes that corruption undermines the rule of law. 64 The rent-seeking
behaviour of public officials necessarily harms the public. Failure to apply the rule
of law by sanctioning these officials then worsens the state of corruption since the
corrupt agents will have no incentive to cease their corrupt activities.
Using this theory, this dissertation encourages effective prosecution and sanctioning
as the best measures to eliminate the scourge of corruption. It further argues for the
need to ensure that the institutions charged with prosecution operate without any
undue influence.
2.2.2. Principal-agent relationship theory
The study focuses on the principal-agent relationship theory to pose the importance
of transferring prosecution of corruption to bodies outside the formal arms of
government. The theory views corruption as criminal behaviour on behalf of some
agents entrusted to act on the behalf of some principal. 65 Lack of 'political will' of
leaders to implement anti-corruption reforms is typically flagged as an explanation
for the failure ofanti-corruption efforts." It is suggested that the principal may have
little incentive to ensure effective measures to reduce corruption since he benefits
from the corrupt act.67
(i.l Smith A, An inquiry into the Nature and Causes ofthe wealth ofNations . Modem library, New York, 200 I, Chapter
5
65 Rose-Ackerman S, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy . Academic Press, New York, 1978, 6;
See also Klitgaard, R, Controlling Corruption, 73.
66 Marquette H and Peiffer C, 'Theoretical (Mis)understanding? Applying Principal-Agent and Collective Action
Theories to the Problem of Corruption in Systemically Corrupt Countries', as submitted to Routledge Companion to
Ethics and Public Service Organizations, 2015, 3.
67 Lambsdorff J, 'How Corruption in Government Affects Public Welfare-A review of theories ' , Center For
Globalization And Europeanization Of The Economy, Discussion Paper 9, Georg-August-Universitat Gottingen,
I 2001,5-8.
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The theory then suggests that corruption would be reduced if the incentives allowed by the
institutional principal-agent structure of corruption were removed. Applying this theory, this study
will argue that moving prosecution of corruption offences away from the government would
remove this incentive to be ineffective in prosecution of corruption cases and thus suggest that the
EACC be granted prosecutorial powers.
The principal-agent relationship assumes that the principal and agent have divergent interests such
that the agent pursues interests which disadvantage the principal. 68 The principal in this instance
is the benevolent one and the agent seeks to act for his selfish interests. Based on this , corruption
occurs where the agent acts against the interests set up by the principal and colludes with third
parties to promote his own benefit. 69 The risk that the agent will not work in the interests of the
principal arises because quite often, the principal cannot perfectly monitor and control the agents."
The agent usually enjoys an informational advantage such that he has private information about
some aspect of his job or his ability to do the job and thus can easily take some action, which will
remain undetectable to the principal."
Owing to the asymmetric information, the principal is unable to determine the type ofagent except
through the use of a supervisor.72 The supervisor should in this case act in the interest of the
principal and diligently discharge his duties for the principal. The addition of a new party modifies
the relationship to create a principal-agent-supervisor relationship. Tirole, however, explains that
the supervisor -like the agent- is a rational economic actor who is interested in maximising his
desires, often wealth. This essentially shows the corruptibility of the supervisor to perform or omit
performance of his role in return for increased wealth. In this regard, they can be bribed into
concealing information about corrupt dealings of the agent. 73 Despite the risk of collusion with the
68 Ross S, 'The economic theory of agency : The principal's problem', The American Economic Review, Vol 63 No.
2, 1973, 134.
69 LambsdorffJ, 'Corruption and rent-seeking', Volume 113, Public Choice , Issue 1,2002,97.
70 Stephenson M, 'Corruption is both a "principal-agent problem" and a "collective action problem" " The Global
Anticorruption Blog, April 9 20 IS. - https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/20 15/04/09/corruption-is-both-a-principal-
agent-problem-and-a-collective-action-problem/ on 12 December 2016 .
71 Schlicht E, Firms, Markets , and Contracts: Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics, 2012 , 110.
ri Brandt U and Svendsen G, The Politics ofPersuasion , Chapter 3.
73Tirole, J, 'Collusion and the Theory of Organizations', in Laffont JJ, (ed.) I Advances in Economic Theory, Vol. 1,
1992.
Brandt U and Svendsen G, The Politics ofPersuasion , Chapter 3.
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agent, a supervisor remains useful to the principal largely because of the possibility to monitor the
behaviour or reports of both agent and supervisor as a means to detect an illegal collusion.?"
The principal-supervisor-agent theory is largely applied in relation to the behaviour of employees
within an organisational set-up. This dissertation puts forth the idea that the behaviour of the
different actors in an organisation is, if not the same, extremely similar within a government. For
the purpose of this study, the common factor identified between the two set-ups in the principal-
agent-supervisor relationship is the risk of collusion between an agent and supervisor. The
proximity between supervisor and agent in an organisation would also be true of a supervisor and
agent in government capacity.
In a government set-up, the principal (P) would be a superior government official empowered to
discharge certain functions within government. P would have an agent (A), usually a bureaucrat at
his employ to whom he will delegate the task of performing said function, or some lesser role.
Since information asymmetry usually exists between agent and principal curtailing P's ability to
monitor the agent, the principal may opt to employ a Supervisor(S) who shall be fit to monitor,
detect, audit, and report any wrong doing on the part of the agent, and perhaps even prosecute the
agent.
More specific to the context of this study, P entrusts A to discharge some duty in the interest of
the public service. S, on the other hand, is entrusted to ensure that A does not obtain private gain
by use of this position (i.e. does not engage in corrupt activity). In some circumstances, S would
be empowered not only to investigate but also to prosecute A before a court of law. S will thus be
empowered to bring proceedings for corruption offences on the part of A. As discussed, the
Supervisor (S) is corruptible especially when the relationship with A is close. The argument that
this dissertation makes is that should S be part of the government, he would be easily corruptible.
It instead proposes that S should not be part of the government as this would increase the likelihood
of the incidence of corruption.
74 Balliga S, 'Monitoring and Collusion with "Soft" Information,' 15 The Journal ofLaw. Economics. & Organization ,
No.2, 1999,434.
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Where S is the prosecuting authority in this regard, it should be as far from the government as it
possibly can be. Corruption has been defined as the misuse of public power for private gain.75
Private gain, however, does not only refer to money and other tangible assets but also refers to
intangible benefits such as increased power, status , and promises of future favours." Should S be
part of government, A is more likely to offer a bribe due to the close proximity within which they
work. Where S is not in government, A is unlikely to offer and S unlikely to accept if the bribe
should be offered . Since S is a rational economic actor, he will also appreciate a cost-benefit
analysis and reject the offer because the costs of getting caught outweigh any benefits.
Where S is an office entrusted with the role of detecting , investigating or prosecuting corruption
cases of A, S would better discuss this duty without risk of collusion where S is an independent
anti-corruption body. S would be unlikely to conspire with A. The use of S reduces the incentive
to engage in corruption since it increases the probability of getting caught and punished."
Applied to the specific context of Kenya, investigation and prosecution of corruption offences
should be in the hands of the EACC. This would minimise opportunities for the prosecutors (S)
and any government agent to collude. The current position is that the DPP is the body
constitutionally responsible to prosecute corruption. This theory alleges that the prosecutors in the
DPP 's office are ineffective because their close proximity to government allows them to be easily
be influenced by government officials. The ODPP has been reluctant in the fight against graft
because of this influence . The EACC would be less likely affected by this because their role is not
proximate to government officials and thus can hardly be influenced unduly.
The ideas of many authors writing on corruption in Kenya directly or indirectly support the
conclusion of the principal-agent theory. Kwake et al for instance argue in support where they
write : "Why is conuption thriving in Kenya? The answer is simple and bold: the leadership at the
top, the Executive ann of the government, is either deeply involved or simply reluctant to punish
75 Rose-Ackerman S, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform , Cambridge Universit y Press,
Cambridge , 1999,91.
76 Lambsdorff10, The Institutional Economics ofCortuption and Reform: Theor y , Evidence and Policy, Cambridge
University Press, 2007, 16.
77 Hanna R, Bishop S, Nadel S, Scheffler 0, and Durlacher K, The effectiveness ofanti-corruption policy. What has
worked, what hasn't and what we don't know: A syst ematic review, Technical Report, EPPI-Centre, 2011, 2.
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those who are involved for fear of rocking his government, or both ."78 This displays the principal-
agent problem where a supervisor has little incentive to punish the agent owing to political
patronage as well as undue influence by the agent. The solution would here be the reduction of
such undue influence. Using the principal-supervisor-agent theory, this dissertation argues that the
best measure to reduce this influence is to confer prosecutorial power on the EACC. This conferral
would reduce corruption since it would reduce the incentive of the agent to engage in corruption
by increasing the probability of the agent to be caught and punished;"
2.3. Research Methodology
This dissertation has relied on secondary sources as the only source of information. The
dissertation has been informed by legislations, books, case law, journal articles , organization
reports, opinion pieces , internet sources, newspaper articles, and other published works written on
the subject of corruption. This dissertation has employed the use of all this material to provide a
proper analysis of the research topic and draw arguments that have been used to extrapolate the
conclusions and recommendations that this dissertation arrives at. These works have in one way
or another, all contributed towards the realization of the research objectives of this dissertation.
While primary research remains an important tool for research, it emerged that the information
had already been covered in secondary sources. This was so much that primary research would
unlikely yield any new results and would echo the secondary material. Secondary sources were
sufficient for this study.
This dissertation is further guided by the principles of ethics and integrity in research. In line with
anti-plagiarism rules and the ethical research policies of Strathmore University Law School, the
dissertation has ensured the proper referencing and citation of all material used in this study.
78 Kwaka J, Okombo 0, Muluka 8 & Sungura-Nyabuto 8 (eds.), Challenging the Rulers: A Leadership Modelfor
Good Governance, East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 2011, 18.
79 Halma R, et al, The effectiveness ofanti-corruption policy, 2, 7.
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CHAPTER 3
Overview of corruption in Kenya
3.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter is divided into two sections . Section 1 gives a brief overview of corruption and
corruption offences in Kenya . It begins by providing the working definition ofcorruption that will
be used in this dissertation and thereafter details the types of corruption that will be the focus of
this dissertation. The second section shall look into the history of corruption offences in Kenya
since independence. The specific focus shall be on the corruption in the four different regimes
since independence where the dissertation shall analyse how the different regimes have treated
corruption and the prosecution of corruption.
3.2.Definition of corruption
Despite the existence of multiple laws and publications on the subject, there is no definition of
corruption that has yet acquired universal acceptance. The term is instead often used with a
negative connotation in reference to a wide range of criminal activities. Though scholars differ on
the conception of corruption.f" many publications agree, though with slight variations on
terminology, that that the illegal action defining corruption is 'the abuse ofpublic office for private
benefit' .81
Most legislations and international conventions on corruption do not expressly define corruption.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not define corruption.
According to Monica (2004), the negotiators ofUNCAC considered not defining corruption at all
but to list specific types or acts of corruption. Criminalization of corruption would thus cover
specific offences or groups of offences that depended on what type of conduct was involved ,
80 Thiankolu M, 'The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 ; Has Kenya Discharged her Obligations to
Her Peoples and the World? ' Kenya Law Reports. 2006.
SJRose-Ackerman, S 'Corruption and Democracy ' 90 American Society ofInteniationaI Legal Proceedings, 1966,83;
Gray & Kaufmann 'Corruption and Development' (1998) World Bank Paper. -
http://www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/0398/articles/020398.htm on 14 September 2016.
Fantaye D 'Fighting Corruption and Embezzlement in Third World Countri es ' 68 Journal of Criminal Law, 2004,
171; Kaufm ann, D 'Corruption, Govemance and Security: Challenges for the Rich Countries and the World ' World
Bank Global Competitiveness Report 2004/2005, 2004. -
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCORIResources/Kaufmann GCR 101904 B.pdf on 14
September 2016;
Thiankolu M, 'The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003', 2.
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whether those implicated were public officials, whether cross-border conduct or foreign officials
were involved, and if the cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment. 82
An understanding of corruption may be seen from article l5(b) of UNCAC which prohibits 'the
solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official acts or refrains from
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties'. 83 The act goes further to criminalise actions
such as: bribery, embezzlement, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, laundering of proceeds of
crime and concealment of property. 84
Similarly, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (hereinafter
AU Anti-Corruption Convention) merely defines corruption as 'the acts and practices including
related offences proscribed in this Convention'. 85 It then prohibits 'the solicitation or acceptance
by a public official, or the offering or granting to a public official or any other person a gift, favour,
promise or advantage in exchange for the performance of public functions'. 86
Kenya's Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) defines corruption as meaning 'an
offence under any of the provisions of sections 39 to 44, 46 and 47, bribery, fraud, embezzlement
or misappropriation of public funds, abuse of office, breach of trust; or an offence involving
dishonesty- in connection with any tax, rate or impost levied under any Act ; or under any written
law relating to the elections of persons to public office'Y In defining corruption, the ACECA,
aside from only pointing out the acts that constitute corruption, includes the various offences
criminalized in the Act as part of the definition of corruption. This is a unique feature since it
means that the commission of any of the offences listed in the Act will constitute corruption, thus
expanding the definition of corruption. The corruption offences as per Part IV are as follows: a)
Bribery involving agents, b) secret inducements for advice; c) deceiving principal; d) conflicts of
82 Monica A, 'Networking Civil Society in Latin America', 2004, 66.
83 United Nations Convention Against Corrupt ion adopted December 2003 in Mexico. This treaty entered into force
on 15 December 2005. - http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crimeconventioncorruption.htmlon 14 September 2016.
84 Article 15-24, United Nations Convention against Corruption (31 October 2003) UN Doc. N58/422 (2003) 43
ILM 37.
85 Article 1, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (3 February 2007) 43 ILM 5. -
http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties /Text/Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf
on 14 September 2016.
86 Article 4, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (3 February 2007) 43 ILM 5.
87 Article 2, Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No.3 of2003).
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interest; e) improper benefits to trustees for appointments; f) bid rigging; g) abuse of office and ;
h) dealing with suspect property.
It is argued that the absence of a clear definition ofcorruption in Kenya implies that anti-corruption
initiatives are being directed towards something unknown and thus could be one cause for the
supposed failure of these initiatives.f The thinkers of the UNCAC, on the other hand, considered
that the convention should not include a definition of corruption but rather criminalizes forms of
corruption. f" This acts as a de-facto definition of corruption and enables states to deal with other
forms of corruption that may emerge. 90
The working definition of corruption in this dissertation shall include the forms of corruption in
the ACECA.
3.3.Types of Corruption
Kibwana et al identify three types of corruption - Petty corruption, grand corruption, and 100ting.9 1
Petty corruption involves payment of small sums of money to low level public servants in order to
speed up access to public services or to avoid legal sanctions for minor infractions. 92
Grand corruption is defined by Transparency International (TI) as "the abuse of high-level power
that benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to
individuals and society.Y" It often involves the payment of huge sums of money by or to senior
government officials and high occupying private sector members. This is often in exchange for
some private gain by either party which tends to enrich them substantially. A key example of this
is a kickback paid to government officials for government public works contracts.
88 Amukowa W, 'The Challenges of Anti-Corruption Initiatives', 482 .
89 United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime , Travaux Preparatoires of the negotiation of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, United Nations; New York, 2010 , 30; United Nations General Assembly, Ad Hoc
Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, ' Revised draft United Nations Convention against
Corruption' NAC.261/3/Rev.2, 2002, 6.
90 Babu R, 'The United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Critical Overview' Available at:
http ;//ssrn.comlabstract=891898
9 1 Kibwana K et al. (eds .), Initiatives against corruption in Kenya , 137
92 Githongo J, "The culture of corruption in Kenya", Annual General Meeting of the German Development Service
in Kenya, Trisan Hotel , Friday I December 2000, I.
93 Transparency International, 'What Is Grand Corruption And How Can We Stop it?' , 2 1 December 2016. -
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/what is grand corruption and how can we stop it on 07 September
2016 .
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Looting, on the other hand involves the spending ofhuge amounts ofmoney by senior government
officials for the delivery of services or goods that end up not being delivered. Looting usually
involves politicians paying companies for fictitious projects at massive costs , which affect the
entire economy." This type of corruption occurs where there is pervasive corruption characterised
by bad governance and unaccountability.
This dissertation will focus on looting and grand corruption since these types of corruption have
the loudest effects on the economy. Grand corruption leads to misallocation of public resources,
and affects the decision-making process substantively." Githongo points out that looting involves
figures so huge that they have quick macro-economic effects such as causing banks to collapse,
causing increased inflation, and causing the decline of exchange rates ."
3.4.0verview of corruption in Kenya
3.4.1. Kenyatta Era (1963-1978)
Mzee Jomo Kenyatta was Kenya's first president. He took over in 1963 from the British leadership
who had been installed by the Crown during colonialism. A key feature of his rule was the
continued use of colonial structures and policies. This had negative effects since these colonial
structures were designed to serve the interests of the Crown and to benefit the white settlers in
Kenya.?? Kenyatta used 'divide and rule' policies and reward systems to consolidate power around
himself and the Presidency. He created a ruling class of loyalists who were rewarded with land,
money, and political positions."
The Kenyatta era maintained the anti-corruption legislation used pre-independence, they applied
the Prevention of Corruption Act and other anti-corruption clauses in other legislation, especially
the Penal Code." However, this regime used corruption as part oftheir survival strategy as a means
to distribute political patronage and maintain coercive control. 100 Chweya explains that the
government obstructed all attempts at anti-corruption interventions in the public service, and that
94 Kibwana K et al (eds.), Initiatives against corruption in Kenya, 137
95 Byrne E, 'The Moral and Legal Development of Corruption: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Corruption in
Ireland. ' PhD Thesis, University of Limerick, 2007.
96 Githongo J, "The culture of corruption in Kenya", 1.
97 Amutabi M, 'Beyond imperial presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes and
implications for democracy and development', Kenya Studies Review Vol. I, No.1, pp. 55-84, 2009, 55.
98 Amutabi M, 'Beyond imperial presidency in Kenya' , 59.
99 Chweya L, 'The government anti-corruption programmes', in Sihanya B (ed .), Control of Corruption in Kenya:
Legal Political Dimensions, 2001-2004, Claripress, Nairobi, 2005, 10.
100 Chweya L, 'The government anti-corruption programmes', II.
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the criminal justice system was made a mockery of since the Prevention of Corruption Act and
Penal Code were applied selectively against less prominent leaders and opposition Ieaders.!"
The Kenyatta presidency was marked by the immense power held by the president. All power was
centralised around his office - The president: appointed and dismissed the cabinet, civil servants,
and provincial administration; determined the parliamentary calendar as a Member of Parliament
himself and; determined judicial tenure. 102 President Kenyatta also championed a series of
constitutional amendments that gave the presidency above them especially noting the amendment
of article 59 of the 1963 Constitution which awarded the president powers to suspend the
proceedings of or dissolve the legislature, thus giving the president control over parliament. 103
A key feature in this regime was also the tribal nature of politics. The Kikuyu were dominant in
both politics and business owing to the special advantages that Kenyatta created for them through
his control of civil service and the legislature. 104 As pointed out by Amutabi, by 1978 there were
35 Kikuyu District Commissioners (DCs) out of41 positions; 5 Kikuyu Provincial Commissioners
(PCs) out of 8 positions; and 13 Kikuyu Permanent Secretaries (PSs) out of the 19 positions.l'"
Tribalism in this regime was to ground its claws to Kenya's politics for years to come and playa
major role in the continued corruption by government officials.
The centralised power of the president caused public officers to pursue and act in accordance to
what they believed to be the direction or inclinations of the President rather than uphold the law.
This bred corruption and immunity and negated public accountability.l'" Moreover, Kenyatta
succeeded in ensuring a de facto one party rule which discouraged political competition and
fostered impunity.107 Criticism against the president or his agenda was greeted with hostility and
was a dangerous avenue to pursue . For instance, the assassination ofJM Kariuki, who was a fervent
101 Chweya L, 'The government anti-corruption programmes' , 10-12.
102 Nasong'o S, and Murunga G , Prospects for democracy in Kenya, Dakar : CODESRIA, 2007 , 269
103 Mutula S, Muna W, and Koma G, 'Leadership and political corruption in Kenya: Analysis of the 2010
Constitutional provisions on the presidency' , The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 38,
Number 3, pages 263-286, Fall 2013, 268.
104 Chege M, 'Kenya: Back From the Brink?' Journal ofDemocracy . Vol. 9, No.4, pages 125-139,2008, 127.
105 Amutabi M, 'Beyond imperial presidency in Kenya' , 61.
106 Bagaka 0 , 'Restructuring the provincial administration : An insider's view'. SID Constitution Working Paper No.
3,2011,3.
107 Akech M, Institutional reform in the new Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: International Center for Transitional
Justice, 2010, 366.
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critic of Kenyatta and his corrupt policies of land redistribution, under 'suspicious
circumstances' .108
The Executive (mainly the president), during this era succeeded in entrenching their control and
power over all public officials in all the arms of government. This centralised power paved way
for increased impunity and unchecked political power which, favoured the growth of corruption
and obstructed any attempts at introducing good anti-corruption measures. 109
3.4.2. Moi era (1978-2002)
Daniel arap Moi took office in August 1978 after Kenyatta's death. Moi was an official of the
KANU (Kenya African National Union) political party and had been Kenyatta's vice president, it
therefore came as no surprise that the dominant presidential powers and political patronage of his
predecessors rule continued after his assent to presidency.
Corrupt policies continued though with minor changes. Tribal politics, for instance, continued with
the difference being that the Kalenjin became favourites and obtained dominance in business and
politics. l ID By 1991, there were 45 Kalenjin DCs out of 66 available positions; 4 Kalenjin PCs out
of 8 positions and; 17 Kalenjin PSs out of the 28 available positions. I II This ethnic favouritism
was a means to gain patronage where the Kalenjin ruling class received rewards in exchange for
supporting Moi regime thus enabling him retain power. 112
Moi similarly continued to centralise power around himself through championing constitutional
amendments. The most notable of these amendments came in 1991 where Moi succeeded in
making Kenya a de jure one-party state. 113 Political competition was stifled out and this became
intensified following the 1982 attempted coup which caused the Moi regime to step up measures
108 Mutula S, Muna W, and Koma G, 'Leadership and political corruption in Kenya', 270.
"In an attempt to mitigate a potential revolt, Kenyatta had ordered an investigation into the murder. A list of
government security officers was implicated, but none of them was ever punished."
109 For instance, the government was against Hon. Martin Shikuku's motion to establish a Parliamentary Select
Committee on Corruption arguing that the police were working on this. Even after parliament approved the motion
and the committee was formed, the committee was disbanded within one month at the instigation of ministers in the
committee.
See Chweya L, 'The government anti-corruption programmes' , 12.
110 Figaro J, 'Domestic actors and liberalization: A case study of internal and external pressures in Moi 's Kenya' .
Contemporary Politics Volume 19 Issue 3, 2013, 222.
III Amutabi M, 'Ethnicity and Kenya 's Civil Service: A Retrospection l, Mimeo' , Department ofDevelopment Studies,
Moi University , Kenya, 1999, 8.
112 Mu1liL, 'Understanding elect ion clashes in Kenya, 1992 and 1997', 8 African Securities RevielVIssue 4, 1999, 77.
113 Barkan J. D, 'Kenya: Assessing risks to stability' , Centre for strategic and international studies, 2011, 6
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intended to suppress opposition including torture, surveillance, arbitrary detention and other forms
of abuses.114
The era was characterised by what Throup termed as "formal corruption". This refers to high level
corruption in the public service. 115 The level of corruption increased during this regime mostly
involving high government officials including government ministers and the president himself.
The most notable of these is the Goldenberg scandal which involved businessman Kamlesh
Pattni's conspiracy with government officials to have his company, Goldenberg International, be
awarded government contracts to export fictitious amounts of gold and diamonds from Kenya to
the rest of the world, the officials would receive a percentage. The Kenyan government agreed to
pay Goldenberg at the rate of 35% of its exports, which was above the 20% limit.'!" The
Commissioner of Customs refused to pay this but then Minister of Finance, Hon. George Saitoti
ordered the treasury to pay this amount. Goldenberg were paid an extra $4.2 million in 2 years
using public funds . It is estimated that the scandal cost the country more than 10% of its GDP. 117
However, the oppression of political figures and media in Moi's KANU fuelled calls for multi-
partyism. This came to pass in 1992 after pressure from politicians, civil society and even religious
groups. I IS Political competition in the multi-party era served as a useful check against high level
corruption in Kenya . Nonetheless, it was no match for the political patronage and control that Moi
already possessed. The Moi administration continued to engage in rampant corruption and avoided
reforms that would reduce the ability for public gain. The effect was that Kenya's economy
continued to be affected where Kenya's economic performance dwindled from per capita income
of US$271 in 1990 to US$239 in 2002. 119
114 Chege, M, 'Kenya: Back From the Brink?' , 127-128;
Anderson D, 'Yours in struggle for majimbo: Nationalism and party politics of decolonisation in Kenya 1954
64, Journal ofContemporary History, Vol 40 Issue 3, pages 547-564, 2005, 551.
115 Throup D and Hornsby C, Multi-party politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi states and the Triumphs 0/ the
system in the 1992 elections, Oxford, 1992.
116 Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act.
117 Cherotich, L, ' Corruption and Democracy in Kenya', University of Oxford , Undated, 3. -
https:llwww.scribd.com/document/I68017984/Corruption -and-Democracy-in-Kenya on 15 October 2016.
118 Mutula S, Muna W, and Koma G, 'Leadership and political corruption in Kenya' , 273.
119 Francis K, Nekesa P, and Ndungu B, 'Best practices in Constituency Development Fund (CDF)' Nairobi:
Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development, 2009, 2.
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The failure of the KANU government to implement anti-corruption policies and legislation is
indicative of the fact that the government gained from corruption and thus supported policies that
provided opportunities for corruption. 120
3.4.3. Kibaki Era (2002-2013)
Mwai Kibaki became Kenya's third president in 2002. The election ofKibaki under a NARC ticket
signified the end of an era , KANU had been defeated after many years. It was expected that the
regime change would mean an end to corruption and the beginning of better service delivery. This
was the promise that NARC had made to the people during campaigns, one of dedication to
eradicate corruption.V'
The beginning ofKibaki' s term saw important reforms towards reduced corruption. These include:
establishment of the Goldenberg inqui ry122; creation of Ministry of Justice and Constitutional
affairs; creation of position of PS in the office of the President in charge of Governance and
ethics; 123 enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and Public Officer Ethics
Act. These and other reforms were important in the fight against corruption. The Goldenberg
inquiry was the first sign that the new government was dedicated in the fight against corruption;
the new ministry on the other hand demonstrated dedication to justice which would include
pursuing and implementing measures that would bring corruption to an end; the new PS was .
important not only because of the function but also because the PS appointed was the former
executive director of Transparency International, this showed that the government was ready to
work with experts and outsiders to fight corruption. The 2 new Acts were also important steps, the
government was finally making moves towards implementing credible anti-corruption measures.
ACECA further established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission which would work
specifically on anti-corruption.
The hope that was built around this regime, however, came to pass. To the disappointment of all,
the strides made by the NARC regime did not make a lasting difference and the corruption malaise
continued if not worsened. The measures pursued failed . First, the Goldenberg Inquiry seemed to
120 Chweya L, 'The government anti-corruption programmes', 13.
12 1 Otieno G, 'The NARC's Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere over the Rainbow?', African Securities
Review, Vol. 14, No.4, 2005.
122 The commission ofInquiry Act, (Act No.2. of2003).
123 Gathii J, 'Kenya's Long Anti-Corruption Agenda', 34-35.
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be in vam considering that though many government officials were mentioned, none were
convicted.124 Second, Githongo's position was soon vacated after he received several death threats
from government officials and was forced into exile. 125 Third, the ACECA did not confer
prosecutorial power to the KACC (and later the EACC) indicating that many parliamentarians
benefitted from corruption. 126
Transparency International indicated that the public perception of corruption m Kibaki's
government had hardly improved since 2002. 127 A factor encouraging such high corruption
perception may be the ethnic favouritism during the Kibaki era. The dominance of Kikuyu and
other Mount Kenya Groups in politics and parastatals was felt quite heavily with 19 out of34 PSs,
and 23 out of 34 heads of parastatals being from Mount Kenya groups by 2006 .128 This was a
divisive factor during this rule and contributed to high level corruption and impunity by the
government. This ethnicised politics was also a key driver for the 2007-2008 Post-election
violence which caused numerous casualties and entrenched tribal divisions and antagonism.
The high public perception of corruption can also be attributed to the cases of grand corruption
implicating the NARC government. The most notable ofthese was the Anglo-leasing scandal. This
scandal involved 18 different security-related contracts with the government which were
questionable for several reasons including that: the government grossly overpaid to the tune of a
sum of Kshs. 56.3 billion, some of the listed companies were non-existent, and further that none
of the money was recoverable owing to the use of promissory notes. 129 Githongo's investigation
into this scandal uncovered involvement of high level government officials including Kibaki, his
vice president, the AG and the chairman ofKACC amongst others .P? The KACC's investigation
into this affair was interfered with by the judiciary which prohibited KACC's investigation into
124 Chege, M, 'Kenya: Back From the Brink?', 129
125 Glinz C, Kenya's new Constitution, 2010, 8.
126 Gathii J, 'Kenya's Long Anti-Conuption Agenda', 36;
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"Good Start, but More Needs to be Done", Daily Nation, March 27,2009;
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some of the companies said to have benefitted.P'Then AG, Amos Wako also frustrated efforts by
allowing the government to pay the contracts through promissory notes. 132
The escalation of corrupt practices by government officials during this era best illustrates the lack
of confidence in the govemment's ability and dedication towards fighting corruption. The
measures implemented during this era, as indicated above, failed due to efforts made by
government officials to frustrate any positive steps towards fighting corruption. Government-led
efforts seem to lack legitimacy and are instead merely intended to create an illusion of dedication
towards the fight while at the same time, being means to impede anti-corruption initiatives.
3.4.4. Uhuru era (2013-2016)
Uhuru Kenyatta took over from Kibaki in 2013. His regime was an embattled one from the
beginning considering that he and his deputy president, William Ruto, were both facing crimes
against humanity charges before the Intemational Criminal Court over the 2007-2008 Post election
violence at the time of their election.
As far as the fight against conuption goes, I would say that there was hope of reduced conuption
during this era. This is largely owing to the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. This
Constitution embodied fresh dedication in the fight against conuption where it contained. Article
79 provided that Parliament shall enact legislation establishing an independent Ethics and Anti-
Conuption Commission. This marked the first time such anti-conuption commission was
entrenched by the constitution thus ensuring more legitimacy of the EACC. Chapter 6 also
addresses leadership and Integrity expected of all State and Public Officers.
The Uhuru regime has, however, had a worse record of corruption. There have been several
corruption scandals by govemment officials only within the first 4 years of this administration. 133
There have been several major corruption scandals, most of them involving the government
131 Okwembah D, "Is this the End of the Anglo-Leasing Investigations?" Daily Nation, July 8,2009.
132 "Standard team, 'Kenya: KACC Accuses Attorney General ofFrustrating Graft War' The Standard, 25 September
2006-< http://allafrica.comlstories/200609250173.html>on 10 December 2016.
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departments, government officials, or parastatals.P" The most notable of these include: 135 the
Geothermal Development Company tendering scandal (Kshs. 10 billion), Standard Gauge Railway
tendering scandal (KSh314.2 billion), Anglo-leasing payout reward (Kshs. 3 Billion), Karen Land
saga (Kshs. 8 Billion), IEBC 'Chickengate' scandal (Kshs. 50 Million), and the National Youth
Service Scandal (Kshs. 791 Million).
While decentralisation usually fosters more accountability by increasing the ability to monitor
bureaucrats, 136 a negative trend has been seen concerning devolution in Kenya. A clear example
is the NYS Scandal involving misappropriation by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning. The
EACC has further reported that corruption is the major challenge affecting the counties .P? Former
EACC commissioner Rose Macharia reported that "devolution creates avenues that could be
exploited by the corrupt to the detriment of citizens."!"
The government in this era has demonstrated even less political will to fight corruption. The EACC
has been rocked by political pressure which has resulted in the resignation of two directors so
far. 139 The rampant corruption at different levels and departments of governmentv'" has also been
a key factor affecting the fight against corruption, it has resulted in hypocrisy by leaders who report
graft later to be implicated in different scandals. 141 Anti-corruption efforts are hardly taken
134 The Real Deal, 'The shocking list of Jubilee administration 24 months of mega corruption', 17 March 2015.
https://deepcogitation.com/2015/03/ 17/the-shocking-Iist-of-jubilee-administration-24-months-of-mega-coffimtion/
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seriously by the political elite owing to the country's poor record of convicting public officials. 142
This has been worsened by seemingly credible claims of corrupt practices by EACC
officials .143The country continues to suffer at the hand of graft.
3.5.Consequences of Corruption in Kenya
This dissertation is largely concerned with the effects of corruption on the economy. The focus on
the economic costs of corruption is in order to justify the anti-corruption initiatives on an economic
basis. The recommendations proposed by this study shall therefore be based solely on rational
economic arguments and shall serve to reduce the costs that the economy incurs as a result of
corruption and poor anti-corruption measures.
Corruption is the single greatest obstacle to economic development. 144Corruption undermines
economic growth where it adversely affects important determinants ofeconomic performance such
as investment, macro-financial stability, and factors ofproduction. 145 Corruption further frustrates
the labour market in Kenya thus causing a strain to the economy where less individuals pay taxes
owing to unemployment. Relying on a World Bank report.v" U.S president Barrack Obama
pointed out that corruption costs Kenyans 250,000 jobs every year. 147 PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC) reported that 35% of Kenya's work force (4,000 employees) were ghost workers where
some employees could not be identified, others had fake qualification documents, some did not
exist in human resources records, and others held dubious employment letters. 148
As Jain asserts, the effects of corruption are felt throughout the economy and are not merely
confined to the specific corrupt transactions. 149 Kenya's economy has suffered overtime owing to
the effects of corruption. In 2001 for instance, the economy suffered immensely owing to risk of
142 Musau N, 'Where is the weak link in Kenya's fight against corruption ' , I.
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not receiving $300 Million in international aid built into the budget owing to sanctions placed
because ofthe government's reluctance to combat corruption. ISO
The finance minister in his 2010 report to parliament pointed out that the government was losing
4 billion dollars annually as a result of corruption. lSI This sum was nearly a third of the 2010
national budget. In 2005, it was reported that Kenya's GDP growth reduces yearly at an average
of 0.03% owing to corruption'V and her per capita GDP reduces at an average of 92 US Dollars
annually.P'' The economic growth of Kenya thus continues to dwindle as a result of rampant
corruption.
In conclusion, corruption has been seen to affect several sectors of the Kenyan economy. It has led
to skewed distribution of income and wealth, increased costs of doing business, discouraged local
and foreign investment, poverty increase, distorted resource allocation, reduced job creation,
limited economic growth, and disproportioned developrnent.P"
Effective anti-corruption efforts should thus be pursued in order to deal with corruption. An
effective campaign against corruption would result in: increased public revenue, increased investor
confidence, creation of more jobs, improved living standards, stable and increased economic
growth, proportionate development, and poverty alleviation.
150 Mark L 'Anti-graft bill in corrupt Kenya fails in parliament, Lack of passage threatens IMF aid', New York Times
News Service, 15 August 2001
151 Mwachiro K, 'Kenya Corruption costs government dearly', BBe News, Nairobi, 03 December 2010. -
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913876 on 15 December 2016.
152 Dreher A and Herzfeld T, 'The Economic costs of corruption: A survey and new evidence ', Working Paper
0506001, Economics Working Paper Archive, June 2005, Table 4.
153 Dreher A and Herzfeld T, 'The Economic costs of corruption: A survey and new evidence', Table 5.
154 Uhuru Kenyatta, "Speech during the official launch of the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission Strategic Plan
2013-2018, " at the Kenya International Conference Centre, Nairobi: 23 June 2014.
32
CHAPTER 4
Legal and Institutional Framework of Corruption in Kenya
4.l.Chapter Introduction
This chapter will take on a historical approach to analysing the legal and institutional framework
of anti-corruption in Kenya. It shall look at the laws dealing with corruption and its prosecution,
and thereafter the institutions established under these laws to tackle corruption. This chapter is
primarily focussed on analysis. It analyses the way in which prosecution of corruption has been
handled in Kenya and points out the factors which have affected the efficient prosecution of
corruption and economic crimes in Kenya. The second part of this paper shall analyse the
prosecution of corruption in Sierra Leone. It will analyse the anti-corruption framework in Sierra
Leone and the effect of its Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) prosecutorial powers on its
performance and in the fight against corruption.
4.2. Framework during Kenyatta Regime (1963- 1978)
4.2.1. Prevention ofCorruption Act
Kenya inherited many of its post-independence laws from its colonial masters. Its corruption laws
were similarly inherited from the British colonial government which enacted the Prevention of
Corruption Act (POCA) in 1956. 155 This Act served as the legal framework for corruption for
several years before its repeal early in the 2pt century.
Though in hindsight, this Act was one of the most important initiatives against corruption as it set
the ball rolling, the law hardly found any use during the remaining years of Kenya's colonial
government and extending into the full term of the Kenyatta presidency (1964-1978). It seems the
motive for enactment of this Act was not to remedy corruption per se but was merely part of the
Crown's policy in each of its colonies. They enacted anti-corruption laws in each of their colonies.
156There was little activity concerning the Act apart from series of amendments that sought to
clarify terminology used,157 and to define and modify certain offences contained in the Act. 158The
155 Prevention ofCorruption Act (Act No . 33 of 1956).
156 Tuta J, 'Evolution of anti -corruption policy and institutional framework', 66 .
157 Kenya , The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption Bill , July 201956
158 Kenya, The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Bill, Oct. 19, 1967
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debates around the definition and terminology in the Act further made it difficult to hold people
accountable for corruption offences since they protected persons who offers bribes. 159
4.3. Framework during Moi Regime (1978-2002)
4.3.1. 1991 amendment to POCA
In 1991, POCA was amended. This amendment created the Anti-corruption squad. This
amendment came at a time when corruption had become one of the central-most issues of concern
for the international community, especially the donor community. 160 The Moi regime then moved
to make this amendment lest they lose the support of its international partners, on whom it greatly
relied.
4.3.1.1.Anti-Corruption Squad 1991
The Anti-corruption squad was a special unit within the police force specially mandated to
investigate corruption offences.161 The unit was, however, disbanded after a short term of3 years
without much to write home about. 162 Tuta argues that this unit was ineffective in the fight against
corruption while offering the following reasons .163 One, it had few investigators who were regular
police officers with little motivation. Two, its independence was since it was located at the
Criminal Investigations Department (CID) offices. Three , members of the unit lacked necessary
training or preparedness to tackle high-level corruption cases. Fourth, the Squad was itself accused
of rampant corruption. Gathii arrives at a similar conclusion adding that the Squad officers
hesitated to pursue corruption allegations against their superiors noting that the Moi regime was
notorious for its corruption and patronage. 164
4.3.2. 1997 amendment ofPOCA
In 1997, an amended was made on POCA which allowed the insertion of section 11 B of POCA .
165 This amendment sought to establish the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA). KACA
took over the anti-corruption mandate from the Anti-Corruption Squad. KACA was different from
the Anti-Corruption Squad given that it was an independent ACA separate from the government.
This was a condition imposed by the International Monetary Fund in order to continue extending
159 Kenya , The National Assembly, Debates on the Prevention of Corruption Bill, July 201956
160 Gathii J, 'Defining the Relationship between Human Rights and Corruption' , 31 University of Pennsylvania
Journal ofInternational Law, 2009, 19-21.
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permission was not required for prosecution of this particular matter. 173Mwau's KACA had gained
traction and his performance had started to instil public confidence in the dedication against
magendo (graft).'?" His removal from office indicated the lack of government will to curb
corruplion and KACA's lack of independence which, allowed the government to interfere with its
anti-graft mandate.
4.3.2.2.Reconstituted KACA, 1999
In 1999, the KACA was reconstituted with Justice Aaron Ringera appointed its new director.
Ringera was a sitting High Court Judge and a solicitor general in the AG's office.!" This
appointment perhaps corrected the initial 'false start' of the KACA considering that: a) Ringera
was properly appointed under the 1998 rules; b) Ringera was actually qualified for the job; c)
Ringera's KACA received all the necessary resources to pursue its cases. Despite all this, KACA
was also disbanded shortly after.
Ringera 's KACA appeared to be one of the most serious government efforts against corruption
having charged 46 people by the time of its disbandment in December 2000 in addition to 115
other cases being investigated at the time .176 Ringera's three-pronged approach against corruption
appeared to be working. This strategy proposed "the consistent enforcement of the law against
corruption; the prevention of corruption by removing the opportunities that facilitate the crime ;
and the education of the public and enlistment of their support in the fight against corruption." 177
The judiciary returned to haunt the KACA in the High Court case of Stephen Mwai Gachiengo
and Albert Muthee Kahuria v Republic /78(Gachiengo decision) . The court decided in favour of
the applicants that: a) provisions in POCA establishing the KACA are contrary to article 26 of the
constitution; b) it was contrary to the constitutional principle of separation ofpowers for the Head
ofKACA to be a sitting judge of the High Court; and c) Attorney General's consent to KACA's
173 Tuta J, 'Evolution of anti-corruption policy and institutional framework' , 68.
174 Kibwana K, et al, Initiatives against corruption in Kenya, 34.
175 Tuta J, 'Evolution of anti-corruption policy and institutional framework ' , 69.
176 Kibwana K, et aI, Initiatives against corrup tion in Kenya, 35.
m Institute of Economic Affairs , Corruption in Kenya: A Call to Action , Bulletin, August 2000, 4.
See also Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, Strategic Plan 1999-2003, 1999.
178 Stephen Mwai Gachiengo and Albert Muthee Kahuria v Republic, High Court, Miscellaneous application No . 302
of2000.
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development aid to Kenya through the Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 166 Similar
to its predecessor then , the establishment of the KACA did not necessarily demonstrate the
government's will to fight corruption but purposed to please its development partners .
4.3.2.l.Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, 1997
The KA.CA then emerged with a more defined mandate which included: to investigate, and subject
to the directions of the Attorney General, to prosecute for offences under this Act and other
offences involving corrupt transactions. 167
The President then appointed Harun Mwau the new director, alongside the provision for the setting
up a judicial tribunal to remove the director if found to be incompetent or incapable.l'f This
tribunal was called to task in 1998 where it found Mr. Mwau incompetent and recommended his
removal. His removal may perhaps have been justified considering factors that Kibwana et al refer
to as a 'false start' . 169 'False start ' refers to following. One, Mwau was appointed before
publication of rules set to govern appointment of KACA director. Two, Mwau's appointment
represented patronage since he dropped out of the 1997 presidential race and endorsed Moi only
shortly before this appointment. Third, KACA was given very minimal resources to investigate
and prosecute corruption offences. Further, KACA apparently lacked a concrete anti-corruption
strategy. 170
The allegation that ultimately did Mwau in, however, was that he had acted ultra vires by
arraigning suspects in court without the AG's sanctioning.'?' This was specifically after KACA
had brought a case concerning fraudulent imports against then powerful Finance Minister, Simeon
Nyachae and three other treasury officials. 172 Mwau was removed despite the fact that the AG's
166 Kibwana K et al (eds.) Initiatives against corruption in Kenya, 31.
167 Section 21, Prevention a/Corruption Act, Cap 65 of the Laws ofKenya, 1956 (1997 amendment).
168 Section liB (2) (2G) (f), Prevention a/Corruption Act, Cap 65 of the Laws of Kenya , 1956 (1997 amendment) .
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170 Tuta J K, 'Evolution of anti-corruption policy and institutional framework', 68.
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prosecution given as a "formality" and was not valid under the constitution.l"" Following this,
Ringera was removed and KACA disbanded shortly afterwards.
Though Ringera may have had a 'false start ' of his own,1 80 interference by the government, the
judiciary in particular, emerged as the major tool used to fight positive initiatives against
corruption. True to this , Tuta writes that the Gachiengo decision was per incuriam (obviously
wrong) citing 5 reasons which included the following.! " First, article 26 presupposed existence of
prosecuting authorities outside of AG's office and thus KACA was not unconstitutional. Second,
KACA was empowered by section lIB (3) of POCA to carry out prosecutions and KACA
prosecutors appointed and granted prosecutorial powers by the AG in line with section lIB (3) (b)
of POCA and section 85(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).Third, the court should have
applied a purposive approach to the interpretation of POCA and find parliament's intention to
eradicate corruption. They would find that KACA should be allowed to function despite the
challenge of separation of powers, since it was proper for that purpose and did not infringe on
anyone's constitutional rights.
Following the Gachiengo decision, the AG took over all the cases under investigation by the
KACA . Notably, all these cases were either dismissed or withdrawn by the courts.l'" The
government, in a bid to please its international partners by appearing to be dedicated to the fight
against corruption then made legislative attempts to revive the KACA. 183 A Constitutional
Amendment bill was tabled in 2001 184which, aimed at amending the wording ofarticle 26 in order
to find that KACA was constitutional. 185 The bill failed at its third reading. 186 Following this, the
Corruption Control Bill was tabled in the same year. This bill intended to establish another
institution to replace KACA - The Kenya Corruption Control Authority (KCCA).1 87 This bill
attempted to remedy some of the challenges of the KACA by taking away prosecutorial powers. 188
179 Stephen Mwai Gachiengo and Albert Muthee Kahuria v Republic, High Court, Miscellaneous application No . 302
of2000, 13.
180 Kegoro G, 'Justice Ringera 's appointment: Some legal questions, The Advocate, 2nd Quarter, 1999.
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4.3.2.3.Anti-Corruption Police Unit
The Anti-corruption police unit (ACPU) was established on 13th September 2001 headed by the
senior deputy commissioner ofpolice who would be answerable to the Director of the CID.189 The
ACPU was charged with the investigation of all corruption and corruption-related offences
directed to them by the AG, commissioner of police (commissioner) or by their own initiative. 190
ACPU along with the AG took over the investigations of the KACA. 191 The challenges that
affected the ACPU includel'": lack of independence since it's controlled by the CID director and
commissioner of police; it had limited resources to fulfil its mandate; and it was also unable to
prosecute cases that it investigates. It should be noted that the Commissioner and the AG attempted
to bring a prosecution unit within the ACPU but this unit was quickly done away with owing to
technicalities. 193
The performance of the ACPU was exemplary, especially considering the circumstances above.
This could be illustrated by the fact that more cases were reported to the ACPU than the KACA.
ACPU had gained the trust of the community. They received and processed 2,507 cases between
October 2001 and December 2002. 194 This may perhaps be attributed to the fact that they had
access to the police intelligence networks. 195 The ACPU was replaced by the KACC in 2002.
4.4. Framework during Kibaki Regime (2002 -2013)
The election of President Mwai Kibaki in 2002 intensified the fight against corruption as had been
a major slogan during his campaign. 196 Three bills were introduced in parliament in 2003 which
had important implications for Kenya's fight against corruption. First, The Constitution
(amendment) bill intending to create the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) which
would have roles including: investigation, prevention, prosecution, civic litigation and public
education."? Second was the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill which contained the
t 89 Tuta J K, 'Evolution of anti-corruption policy and institutional framework', 77
190 'Head of anti-corruption squad appointed', IRIN News, 14 September 2001
http://www.irinnews.org/report/26763/kenya-head-anti-commtion-sguad-appointed on 15 December 2016;
See Also Daily Nation , 14 September 2001.
i91 Anti-Corruption Police Unit, Annual Report 2002, 2002, 11.
192 Gathii J, 'Kenya's Long Anti-Corruption Agenda', 32.
193 Tuta J K, 'Evolution of anti-corruption policy and institutional framework' , 78
1 9~ Anti-Corruption Police Unit, Annual Report 2002, 2002, 10.
19S Anti-Corruption Police Unit, Annual Report 2002, 2002, 6.
196 Otieno G, 'The NARC's Anti-Corruption Drive in Kenya: Somewhere over the Rainbow? ' , Vol. 14 African
Security Review No.4, 2005. - http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14N04/EOtieno.htm on 19th December 2016
197 Chapter VIII, The Constitution (amendment) Bill, 2003. .
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